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Subsidiarity’s Roots and History: Some
Observations
John Finnis *
Abstract: Subsidiarity, i.e., “the principle of subsidiarity,” i.e., “the principle of sub-
sidiary function/responsibility,” i.e., the principle that it is unjust for a higher authority
(e.g., the state’s government and law) to usurp the self-governing authority that lower
authorities (e.g., in families or other civil associations), acting in the service of their
own members (groups and persons), rightly have over those members, is a presumptive
and defeasible, not an absolute, principle. But it excludes any general policy or aim of
assuming the control or managerial direction of lower groups. Its deepest rationale is
the intrinsic desirability of self-direction (not least in cooperatively associating with
other persons), a good that is to be favored and respected even at the expense of some
efficiency in the pursuit of other goods. Though arising out of Aristotelean moral and
political theory, it denies or strongly disambiguates a cardinal principle of Aristotelean
political theory. It is reflected in the work of Aquinas, Taparelli, Mill and Maitland,
before its articulation by Pius XI (1931).
Keywords: Subsidiarity, Political Philosophy, Aristotle, Catholic Social Teaching
I
The principle of subsidiarity—better put: of subsidiary responsibility—is (i) a devel-
opment of the Aristotelean political science/theory, and (ii) drawing on but going
well beyond Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s communism. But, properly understood, it
(iii) entails a rejection of a key tenet of Aristotle’s own political theory.
The principle has a sense and content that I tried to sum up in Natural Law and
Natural Rights:
[T]he principle is one of justice. It affirms that the proper function of association is to
help the participants in the association to help themselves or, more precisely, to con-
stitute themselves through the individual initiatives of choosing commitments
(including commitments to friendship and other forms of association) and of realizing
these commitments through personal inventiveness and effort in projects (many of
which will, of course, be co-operative in execution and even communal in purpose).
And since in large organizations the process of decision-making is more remote from
the initiative of most of those many members who will carry out the decision, the same
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principle requires that larger associations should not assume functions which can be
performed efficiently by smaller associations.1
So “subsidiarity” is shorthand for “the principle of subsidiarity,” which in turn
is shorthand for “the principle of subsidiary function/responsibility,” shorthand
for the principle that it is unjust for a higher2 authority to usurp the self-govern-
ing authority that lower authorities, acting in the service of their own members
(groups and persons), rightly have over those members. This requirement of
justice is not one of the exceptionless negative moral norms, picking out a kind
of act that (a) ought always to be excluded from deliberation and choice, and (b)
can be identified by reference to its object (specific intention) without reliance on
other moral judgments. Rather, this is a principle of justice that, in its application
to intentions and circumstances, takes its place within a matrix of other moral
judgments3 about what is required to do justice to those whose wellbeing will be
affected by action or inaction in those circumstances. Its force, therefore, is sub-
stantial but presumptive and defeasible. Even in relation to non-instrumental
groups such as families and religious associations, the principle excludes neither
regulation by state law nor the assumption of strong internal managerial functions
for the prevention of concrete injustices to vulnerable members or to third parties.
It does exclude a policy or aim of assuming such control and managerial direction
as the “default” (presumption).4
(i) We can see the rationale of the principle’s proto-emergence as a development
of Aristotelean political theory, in the prologue to Aquinas’s commentary on
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Using Latin synonyms for subsidium (help,
assistance), Aquinas says in para. 4:
Because one (each of us) is by nature a social animal needing for one’s life many things
one cannot get for oneself if alone, one is naturally a part of a group that furnishes one
help [auxilium] to live well. One needs this help in two respects. First, to have the
1 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights [NLNR], 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011; 1st ed. 1980), 146. The endnote to this, on p. 159, quotes the principle’s articulation in Pius
XI, encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (1931), para. 79:
just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to a group what private
initiative and effort can accomplish, so too it is a wrong . . . for a larger and higher association
to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower asso-
ciations. This is a fixed, unchanged and most weighty principle of moral philosophy. . . . Of
its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help [subsidium afferre] members
of a social body, and never to destroy or absorb them.
I added: “Later pronouncements of the Roman Catholic authorities have applied the principle to
relationships of production in the economy (1961, 1967), to world political order (1963) and world
economic order (1965), to the relationships between families, schools, and the state (1965), to the
ecclesiastical community (1969), and to politics at all levels (1971).” See also n. 27 below.
2 In this context, “higher” and “greater” are to be understood as in the service of—as means to the
flourishing of—“lower” and “lesser,” of which some are substantive (individual-persons) or associ-
ational (nuclear familial) ends in themselves, and others are [= can and should be] associations of a
worth as means equal or greater to that of the associations higher/greater in coercive authority and
responsibility.
3 Signaled in the foregoing statement of the principle by the word “usurp.”
4 See the debate between Leslie Green and me in Reason, Morality & Law, ed. John Keown and















necessaries without which no-one can subsist and get through the present life; and for
this, one is helped (auxiliatur] by the domestic group of which one is a part. For one is
indebted to one’s parents for one’s generation, nourishment and instruction. Likewise
individuals, as family members, help [iuvant] one another to procure the necessities of
life. From the group of which one is a part, one receives help In another way, towards a
more complete sufficiency for life; namely, that one may not only live but live well,
having everything sufficient for living; and in this way one is helped [auxiliatur] by the
civic group of which one is a member, not only in regard to bodily needs—as, in the
political community, there certainly are many crafts which a single household cannot
provide—but also in regard to right conduct [moralia], inasmuch as public authority
restrains with fear of punishment recalcitrant young people whom paternal admonition
is not able to correct.
Such reasoning from needs is a primary key to Aristotelean method in the theory
of human affairs,5 and is operative in the explanation of subsidiarity offered in
Natural Law and Natural Rights:
What is the source of this principle? I touched on it when I discussed the ‘experience
machine’. . . 6 Human good requires not only that one receive and experience benefits or
desirable states; it requires that one do certain things, that one should act, with integrity
and authenticity; if one can obtain the desirable objects and experiences through one’s
own action, so much the better. Only in action (in the broad sense that includes the
investigation and contemplation of truth) does one fully participate in human goods.
One cannot—no one can—spend all one’s time, in all one’s associations, leading and
taking initiatives; but anyone who is never more than a cog in big wheels turned by
others is denied participation in an important aspect of human well-being.7
All this is at least implicit in Aristotle’s own reflections on human nature, reflec-
tions most fully developed in his practical-theoretical treatise on what is needed
for human flourishing, the Nicomachean Ethics. Indeed, the taproot of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity can be said8 to be implicit in Aristotle’s distinction between
practical reasonableness (phronesis) and technical ability (techne) (in other words,
between “doing something” and “making something”): “making aims at an end
distinct from the act of making, whereas in doing the end cannot be other than the
act itself: doing well is in itself the end.”9 More vivid perhaps is Cicero:
“[Practical] wisdom is not like seamanship or medicine, but like the arts of
acting and of dancing—for its end, being the actual exercise of the art, is con-
tained within the art and is not something extraneous to it.”10 And of course,
living a life (and shaping a character) by choice and self-direction matters more
than play-acting or the dance.
5 See a working out of this in John Finnis, “The Nature of Law” in Cambridge Companion to the
Philosophy of Law, ed. John Tasioulas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2017).
6 See NLNR, 95-6.
7 NLNR, 147.
8 As NLNR, 197 says.
9 Nicomachean Ethics 6.4: 1140b3-6; see also 2.4: 1105a32. On this intransitivity of morally
significant (good or bad) choice, see Finnis, Fundamental of Ethics (Oxford and Georgetown:
Oxford University Press and Georgetown University Press, 1983), 138-42, 152-3.
10 De Finibus 2.7.24.














(ii) A more immediate context of the principle’s implicit emergence is, perhaps,
Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s proposal in the Republic that it would be good to
have a sharing of wives and children, and of goods and possessions:
So Aristotle had to begin his Politics with some reminders. Friendship is nothing if it is
not willing the good of one’s friend, committing oneself to helping in one’s friend’s
self-constituting participation in any or all of the basic aspects of human flourishing. In
the first place, then, there will be no friendship if there is no commitment, and to
commit oneself is, in this finite life, to turn aside from an inexhaustible multitude of
alternative commitments that one might have made. In the second place, one can give
nothing to a friend unless one has something of one’s own to give. . . . Only a family or
quasi-family can build up over time that common stock . . . which each member holds
at the others’ disposal, and which . . . constitutes an incomparably fine thing for a friend
to give or receive. . . . Plato’s proposal, made in the name of friendship, is tantamount
to a drastic dilution, ‘watering-down’,11 of friendship—a radical emaciation of a basic
aspect of human well-being. . . .
Still, as Aristotle also points out, if the family is thus to contribute to this growth of its
members in freedom, friendship, and all-round good, it must be liberated from the
requirement of unremitting toil by all its members for material necessities. Things will
be better for everyone if there is a division of labour between families, specialization,
technology, joint or co-operative enterprises in production and marketing, a market and
a medium of exchange, in short, an economy that is more than domestic. And the same
goes for the other goods participated in by the family. The resources not only of
material goods and of technology, but also of language, of knowledge, of aesthetic
experience, of interpersonal concern and religious aspiration, are all more ample than
any family can mediate to its members by itself. Hence, the members of a family will
flourish more fully if, without dissolving their family, they enter into a whole network
of associations with their neighbours. Aristotle speaks of this level of associations as
essentially the community of neighbourhood. But neighbourhood need not be merely
geographical. 12
11 Politics 2.1: 1262bl7.
12 NLNR, 144-6. Russell Hittinger helpfully summarises the relevant points made in Aquinas’s
commentary on Aristotle:
(1) that although polity has a divine-like dignity, it is not socially homogeneous [includit
omnes alia communitates, ad lib. 1 1.1 n. 3]; (2) that the diversity contained in polity cannot
be reduced to quantity [quia differentia quae est secundum magis et minus non diversificat
speciem, ad lib. 1.1.1 n. 6]; (3) that the social components are themselves complex, for
even the household consists not merely of distinct functions but distinct modes of union,
e.g. spouses, children, servants [nos. 9, 11, 17, 19, 24]; (4) that it is necessary to distinguish
between a common good (bonum commune) and goods commonly pooled (bona communia)
[lib. 2.1 n. 10.]; (5) that a progressive series of unifications within the body politic would
produce another individual rather than a society, and in so doing polity would be destroyed
[lib. 2.1 n. 11.]; (6) in conclusion of which, we can understand that a polity should not have
maximum unity [unde patet falsum esse quod Socrates dixit optimum esse in civitate quod sit
maxime una, lib 2.1 1 n. 16].
“The Process of ‘Creative Destruction’ and Subsidiarity: A Response to Professors Archer and
Donati,” in Crisis in a Global Economy. Re-planning the Journey (Pontifical Academy of Social
Sciences, Acta 16, 2011), ed. José T. Raga and Mary Ann Glendon (Vatican City: Pontifical
















We get closer to the core of subsidiarity when we reflect that, just as the dissol-
ution of family and property would water down human friendship, so the com-
plete absorption by the family of its members would radically emaciate their
personal freedom and authenticity, which also are basic aspects of human full-
being. The justification for the family, for its contractual or quasi-contractual
permanence and exclusiveness, for its possessiveness and its possessions, presup-
poses that each member of the family is to be enabled by family life and support
to grow in self-possession (of which self-giving in friendship is one basic aspect).
So subsidiarity is a development of Aristotelean practical reasonableness and of
its theory.
(iii) Yet the subsidiarity principle also rejects, or at least disambiguates, radically, a
cardinal principle of Aristotle’s Politics, formulated near the beginning of the
work in these terms:
Because it is the completion of associations existing by nature, every polis exists by
nature, having itself the same quality as the earlier associations from which it grew. It is
the end or consummation to which those associations move, and the “nature” of things
consists in their end or consummation. . . . Again, the end or final cause is the best.
Now self-sufficiency [autarkeia] [which it is the object of the state to bring about] is the
end, and so the best.13
What the principle of subsidiarity both emerges from and points to is a concep-
tion of the political community’s common good as a wellbeing in which is
included—and not merely as a means to any such end as the autarkeia of the
whole—the flourishing of individuals and families and their appropriate
associations.
Common good is fundamentally the good of individuals (an aspect of whose
good is friendship lived out in community, that is, in groups or communities each
of which has its common good). Common good, which is the object of all justice
and which all reasonable life in community must respect and favor, is not to be
confused with the common stock (bona communia), or the common enterprises,
that are among the means of realizing common good. Common enterprises and
the exploitation and creation of a common stock of assets are alike for common
good because they are for the benefit of the individual members of the community
to which they pertain: talk about benefiting “the community” is no more than a
shorthand (not without dangers) for benefiting the members of that community.
The fundamental task of practical reasonableness is self-constitution or self-pos-
session; inner integrity of character and outer authenticity of action are aspects of
the basic good of practical reasonableness, as are freedom from the automatism of
habit and from subjection to unintegrated impulses and compulsions; even friend-
ship, in its ordinary sense, and the intense community of family require and entail
a certain specialization and limitation of one’s attentions; in short, no common
enterprise can itself bring about the all-round flourishing of any individual. An
attempt, for the sake of the common good, to absorb the individual altogether
13 Politics 1.2.8: 1252b30-1253a3 (trans. Barker).














into common enterprises would thus be disastrous for the common good, however
much the common enterprises might prosper.14
Against Aristotle’s ambiguous “self-sufficiency” of the political community, we
should therefore hold that common enterprises are to be regarded, and practically
conducted, not as ends in themselves but as means of assistance, as ways of
helping individuals to “help themselves” or, more precisely, to constitute them-
selves. And in all those fields of activity, including economic activity, where in-
dividuals, or families, or other relatively small groups, can help themselves by
their own private efforts and initiatives without thereby injuring (either by act or
omission) the common good, they are entitled in justice to be allowed to do so,
and it is unjust to require them to sacrifice their private initiative by demanding
that they participate instead in a public enterprise. It remains unjust even if the
material dividend they receive from the public enterprise is as great as or even
somewhat greater than the material product of their own private efforts would
have been. The principle of subsidiarity is a principle of justice.15
To mark his advance over Aristotle’s political theory, Aquinas deploys the
concept of public good, which I expound in a whole chapter of Aquinas: Moral,
Political, and Legal Theory (1998). A summary paragraph:
Public good is a part or aspect of the all-inclusive common good. It is the part which
provides an indispensable context and support for those parts or aspects of the common
good which are private (especially individual and familial good). It thus supplements,
subserves, and supervises those private aspects, but without superseding them, and
without taking overall charge of, or responsibility for them. “Neither in one’s whole
being nor in one’s belongings is one subordinate to the political community.”16 And
here we may add Aquinas’s partial anticipation of the principle of subsidiarity:17 “it is
contrary to the proper character of the state’s government (contra rationem gubernationis
[civitatis]) to impede people from acting according to their responsibilities (officia)—
except of course in emergencies.”18
II
Essential background to modern articulations of the principle of subsidiarity is its
repudiation, in effect, by the French revolutionary doctrine which F.W. Maitland
emphasized, as the antithesis of his own, in his Sidgwick Lecture in 1903, “Legal
14 NLNR, 168.
15 NLNR, 169.
16 Summa Theologiae I-II q. 21 a. 4 ad 3: homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam
secundum se totum, et secundum omnia; “and so not all one’s acts are meritorious or culpable by
virtue of their relationship to that community.”
17 Namely, that it is unjust for more extensive associations to assume functions which can be
performed efficiently by individuals or by less extensive associations, since the proper function of
instrumental associations is to help their members help themselves: see NLNR, 146, 159.
18 Summa contra Gentiles III c. 71 n. 4 [2470]. What are these responsibilities? Marriage is one
natural responsibility (officium naturae humanae) with which human law is rightly concerned (IV
Sent. d. 27 q. 1 a. 3 sol. 1 ad 1; d. 31 q. 1 a. 2c & a. 3 sed contra 2; d. 39 q. 1 a. 2 ad 3) and a















Personality and Moral Personality.” Here is his translation of the declaration of the
revolutionary assembly on 18 August 1792: “A State that is truly free ought not to
suffer within its bosom any corporation, not even such as, being dedicated to
public instruction, have merited well of the country.” Maitland adds: “It is always
best to begin with France, and there, I take it, we may see the pulverising,
macadamising tendency in all its glory, working from century to century, reducing
to impotence, and then to nullity, all that intervenes between Man and the
State.”19 Maitland saw Roman Law as a potent cause of this tendency long
before the doctrinal excesses of the Revolution, and traced the vitality and reality
of unincorporated, voluntary associations in English civic life to English law’s
evasion of the Roman law idea of the corporation as depending for its existence on
the sovereign’s grant—the primary vehicle of this evasion being the trust, eluding
the Roman law’s insistence that what is not Property must be Obligation (essen-
tially, contract).
English political thought about these matters, in the era into which Maitland
was born in 1850, can be seen to advantage in Mill’s Principles of Political Economy
(1848):
The true reasons in favour of leaving to voluntary associations all such things as they are
competent to perform would exist in equal strength if it were certain that the work itself
would be as well or better done by public officers. These reasons have been already pointed
out: the mischief of overloading the chief functionaries of government with demands on
their attention, and diverting them from duties which they alone can discharge, to
objects which can be sufficiently well attained without them; the danger of unnecessarily
swelling the direct power and indirect influence of government, and multiplying occa-
sions of collision between its agents and private citizens; and the inexpediency of con-
centrating in a dominant bureaucracy all the skill and experience in the management of
large interests, and all the power of organized action, existing in the community; a
practice which keeps the citizens in a relation to the government like that of children to their
guardians, and is a main cause of the inferior capacity for political life which has hitherto
characterized the over-governed countries of the Continent, whether with or without the
forms of representative government.
But although, for these reasons, most things which are likely to be even tolerably done
by voluntary associations should, generally speaking, be left to them; it does not follow
that the manner in which those associations perform their work should be entirely
uncontrolled by the government.20
And here Mill turns to consider quasi-monopolies such as water or gas sup-
pliers, and railways, regulation of maximum hours of labor, and so forth.
Earlier in the same decade, Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio, S.J. published his Saggio
Teoretico di Dritto Naturale [Theoretical Essay on Natural Law/Right] (1840-43).
At the heart of this eclectic work (which Pius IX was recommending to Catholic
19 F.W. Maitland, Collected Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 3: 303. For an
illuminating discussion of Maitland’s political theory (as illustrated in this 1903 Lecture), and of its
high, exceptional worth, see Alan Macfarlane, “F. W. Maitland and the Riddle of the Modern World:
Maitland Memorial Lecture 2000,” http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/FILES/down_fwm.htm
20 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social
Philosophy ([1848][1885] bk 5, ch. 11, sec. 11 (emphases added)).














students as late as 1929)21 is an ambitious, metaphysical sounding but really
normative ethical-social theory which will have contributed to the thought of
the two philosophers Matteo Liberatore, S.J. and Tommaso Zigliara, O.P.—
each an accomplished philosophical proponent of Aquinas—who drafted Leo
XIII’s encyclical, Rerum Novarum (May 1891). Here subsidiarity, without being
named, is expounded with wide generality in the treatment of liberty, family
(property, parent and child) and state, and later of trade unions. Taparelli
d’Azeglio speaks of (1) the assistance [sussidio soziale] needed by and afforded
to everyone by associating with members who supply aid [concorso], directed by
authority, in associations [consorzi] where the administrator knows the needs of
the individual and applies the forces of the association to help [a sussidio];22 (2)
the duty of the Whole not to destroy the associations subordinated to it in a
sistema ipotattico di associazione [a system of mutually subordinated associations in
which the duty of the whole is to safeguard the existence and flourishing of the
parts];23 (3) the persistence of associations even after the collapse of the Whole
[the state];24 (4) the validity of these principles whether the sistema ipottatico
results from division or composition, and whether the subordinated associations
[parts] have been created by nature, agreement or law.25 He takes his neologism
ipotattico from the Greek hypo-taxis [under-placed], which approximates to the
Latin word sub-sidium for the third, reserve line of troops in the order of battle or,
more generally, the auxiliary force(s)—and thus by extension a word for support,
aid, assistance, protection, etc.26
So Rerum Novarum says the state should respect the individual’s antecedent
right to marry, uphold the family’s rights to own property, and treat the child
below the age of reason as neither autonomous nor a ward of the state but as part
of the family (paras. 12-14). And trade unions, like other private associations,
have the same kind of right to be formed and exist under their own direction as
the state does (paras. 48-52). In each case, the state’s authority and responsibility
to step in and exercise any kind of direction within the association is exceptional,
and is predicated on some collapse or some abuse of right within the family or
other association.
21 Pius XI encyclical Divini Illius Magistri (On Christian Education) (1929), para 50 (on civic
education) n. 33 (calling the Saggio Teoretico “a work never sufficiently praised and recommended to
university students (cfr. Our Discourse of Dec. 18, 1927).” Note that footnote 28 of this encyclical
reads:
28. "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with the high duty, to rec-
ognize, and prepare him for additional duties." U.S. Supreme Court Decision in the Oregon
School Case, June 1, 1925 [Pierce v Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510.]
22 Luigi Taparelli, Saggio Teoretico di Dritto Naturale Appoggiato sul Fatto, 2d ed. (Livorno, 1851),
no. 691.
23 Ibid., nos. 694-7, 713-4.
24 Ibid., no. 699.
25 Ibid., nos. 696, 710:
26 “hypotaxis” as a grammatical term for the use of subordinate clauses seems to emerge after (and















A century later, John Paul II’s 1991 encyclical Centesimus Annus, citing Pius
XI’s Quadragesimo Anno (1931), states “the principle of subsidiarity” thus:
a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community
of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support
[sustentare] it in case of need, and help [adiuvare] to coordinate its activity with the
activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.27
The Treaty on European Union done at Maastricht in 1992 introduced an
article on subsidiarity, which in its present form (Lisbon, 2009) states in art. 5:
5.3: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved at Union level.
Protocol 2 to the Treaty, on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality, has a single-clause explanatory recital: “Wishing to ensure that
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens of the Union . . .” A typical
academic exposition of all this will say something like: “The principle of subsidi-
arity means that the EU must not undertake or regulate what can be managed or
regulated more efficiently at national or regional levels.”28
None of these EU concepts—better (or worse or insufficient) efficiency for
achieving presupposed “objectives” of some “proposed action”; deciding on the
action “close to the peoples”—is adequate to stating or understanding the prin-
ciple. They remain within the framework of French revolutionary flattening out
of social and political thought denounced by Maitland: the reduction of social
realities and issues to “individual and state/Society.”
27 Centesimus Annus, para. 48. One of the two documents of the Second Vatican Council that
mention the principle calls it, twice, the principle of subsidiary responsibility (principium subsidiarii
officii): Gravissimum Educationis (1965) 3 and 6. This is the phrase used in Quadragesimo Anno
(1931), para. 80.
28 Nicholas Moussis, Access to European Union Law, Economics, Policies, 21st ed. (Rixensart, Belgium:
Edit-Eur, 2015), 3.2. The principle was introduced into EU law by the Treaty of European Union
done at Maastricht, 7 February 1992, and was not otherwise a general principle of European law
cognizable by the court of the Union: Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de
Bouwnijverheid v Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 21 February 1995 (T-29/92,
Court of First Instance, ECJ).
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